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Abstract—With a view to the expected increased data traffic
volume and energy consumption of the fifth generation networks,
the use of renewable energy (RE) sources and infrastructure shar-
ing have been embraced as energy and cost saving technologies.
Aiming at reducing cost and grid energy consumption, in the
present paper, we study RE exchange (REE) possibilities in late-
trend network deployments of energy harvesting (EH) macrocell
and small cell base stations (EH-MBSs, EH-SBSs) that use an EH
system (EHS), an energy storage system (ESS) and the smart grid
(SG) as energy procurement sources. On this basis, we study a
two-tier network composed of EH-MBSs that are passively shared
among a set of mobile network operators (MNOs), and EH-SBSs
that are provided to MNOs by an infrastructure provider (InP).
Taking into consideration the infrastructure location and the
variety of stakeholders involved in the network deployment, we
propose as REE approaches (i) a cooperative RE sharing, based
on bankruptcy theory, for the shared EH-MBSs and (ii) a non-
cooperative, aggregator-assisted RE trading, which uses double
auctions to describe the REE acts among the InP provided EH-
SBSs managed by different MNOs, after an initial internal REE
among the ones managed by a single MNO. Our results display
that our proposals outperform baseline approaches, providing
considerable reduction in SG energy utilization and costs, with
satisfaction of the participant parties.
Index Terms—Network sharing, energy sharing, energy trad-
ing, Shapley Value, double auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
A huge traffic increase is expected in the near future [1].
Unless countermeasures are taken, a global percentage equal
to 51% and 23% of energy consumption and carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions, respectively, is foreseen to be generated by
Information and Communication Technology [2].
To address these challenging numbers in the era of the fifth
generation networks (5G), different forms of network sharing
are adopted, as the common use of entities leads to both energy
and cost savings. Network sharing schemes among mobile
network operators (MNOs) vary from passive sharing (i.e.,
mast, generator and tower sharing) and active sharing (i.e.,
sharing of entire radio access networks) to the roaming based
one (i.e., an MNO roams its traffic to a rival one during a
pre-defined period of time and over a pre-defined area) and
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the lease of third party infrastructure by MNOs [3]. When
combined with other technologies, the prospects of increasing
energy and cost savings are further improved.
In this context, despite the high capital expenditure they
introduce, the adoption of renewable energy (RE) sources and
RE distribution have been embraced as effective green cost-
saving techniques for wireless networks [4]. On one hand,
thanks to the production of low or no CO2 emissions by RE
sources, research has focused on the implementation of RE-
supported macrocell and small cell base stations (MBSs, SBSs)
[5], [6]. On the other hand, thanks to the technology revolution
in smart grid (SG) networks [7], research on energy exchange
(EE) between network elements with energy abundance and
energy shortage becomes popular [8]–[13].
Despite their benefits, RE sources and EE raise issues
over the network operation. RE shortage events due to RE
generation unpredictability are a preoccupation for MNOs.
Supporting energy storage systems (ESSs), consisted of battery
series, are usually adopted as a countermeasure [14]. Their
storage capacity though is upper limited. Moreover, both the
RE and ESS equipment aggravate the space scarcity issues that
MNOs face at their site installations [15]. The EE technique
complements the use of an ESS, balancing the drawbacks of
storage limitation and space scarcity. Energy can be exchanged
at, adjustable to needs, volumes and with or without payment,
which corresponds to energy trading and sharing, respectively.
EE can be implemented using power lines [8], the SG [9]–[12],
or with the aid of an aggregator [13], when the energy volume
available for exchange is limited [16].
Only limited and recent works explore the implications of
adopting RE source and EE in multi-operator environments.
Collocation and ownership of networks affect the choice of
an EE model. Multi-operator collaborative energy trading
agreements with energy retailers and directly with the energy
market are studied in [17] and [18], respectively. These works
study the activity of multiple MNOs in the same area, leaving
out however, space scarcity scenarios that oblige sharing of
both network and energy harvesting (EH) infrastructure. In
such cases, a fair allocation of RE volumes to the stakeholders
involved in the sharing should be given careful consideration
so as to cover their individual energy needs.
Fairness in energy sharing was studied only recently in [19]
and with respect to the improvement of the communication
service quality in the network. However, only collocated
BSs of rival MNOs are assumed, while energy sharing is
implemented via the SG. Thus, challenging EE prospects in
multi-MNO scenarios are not explored. An indicative example
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is the use of private power lines among network elements of
rival MNOs, which has been studied as a permanent solution
only in single-MNO scenarios [8], [9]. Lastly, it leaves out
popular multi-MNO architectures, e.g., with a third party [20],
where the conflicting interests of stakeholders could hinder EE.
More are the challenges though in EE acts among multiple
MNOs. Achieving energy neutrality with EE in a multi-tier
wireless network is one of them. In detail, energy neutrality for
MBSs is more challenging and expensive than for SBSs, since
MBSs provide the umbrella coverage in an area and are more
energy hungry. Moreover, rival MNOs often co-locate their
MBSs in urban areas due to the high traffic load volumes and
site regulations, whereas SBSs are overlaid all over a macrocell
area. Thus, the encounter of a both permanent and unified
solution for MBSs and SBSs is difficult. At the same time,
for all stakeholders that participate in a sharing agreement,
disclosure of private information and the extend to which they
will do it, is a hot potato issue. Involving an impartial entity
might be necessary when information disclosure is extensive.
Addressing all aforementioned issues with simple ap-
proaches, meanwhile ensuring fairness for the stakeholders
that participate in a multi-operator EE act is a demanding task.
In this paper, we go beyond the existing literature by exploring
EE in late-trend multi-MNO heterogeneous network (HetNet)
deployments that use EH as energy source, along with the SG.
To this end, we study a scenario in which MNOs manage a
two-tier wireless HetNet with an EH system (EHS) and an ESS
available at each site. In our scenario, MNOs apply passive
sharing for the macrocell tier of their network, due to network
planning limitations and in order to address the high energy
needs, CO2 emissions and costs, of an MBS. The small cell
tier infrastructure is composed of EH-SBSs, i.e., SBSs with
respective EHSs and ESSs, and is provided by an InP. We
aim at studying the EE prospects in both tiers, meanwhile
addressing the challenges of a network sharing model that
involves multiple stakeholders of different interests.
To this end, the contribution of this paper is described as
• a cooperative energy sharing scheme via power lines,
applicable to passively shared EH-MBSs. Passive sharing
is assumed as a sharing of the MBS infrastructure, the
EHS and ESS. We propose an energy sharing scheme
among EH-MBSs, or their owner MNOs in the case of
one-to-one correspondence, that refers to the sharing of
the RE that is harvested by the shared EHS and stored
at the shared ESS. EE is carried out through power lines
due to the passive sharing, which presumes collocated
EH-MBSs that are unlikely to be relocated, even though
they belong to rival MNOs. Short-lengthened power lines
are assumed, which result in negligible losses on energy
transfer and circumvent of additional costs due to the SG
or an aggregator. We propose an energy sharing scheme
that is cooperative, as, even though the MNOs of the
passive sharing have rival interests, they have similar
characteristics. Cooperative game theory increases the
value of the total sharing effort, meanwhile preserving the
individual benefits of players. On this basis, we describe
the problem of allocating the harvested and stored RE
to the cooperative MNOs as a bankruptcy game (BG).
BGs refer to the allocation of a determined entity to a
group of players who are interested in it [21]. RE volumes
can be such an entity when they are insufficient to cover
the individual MNO energy needs. Our proposal, namely
RE BG (RE-BG), uses Shapley Value (SV) so that the
cooperative act continues. SV ensures fairness in RE
volume allocation among players MNOs, as it assesses
their individual contribution to the obtained result [22].
• a non-cooperative aggregator-assisted energy trading of
low complexity, applicable to InP provided EH-SBSs that
are managed by rival MNOs. We propose an aggregator-
assisted energy trading among the EH-SBSs of rival
MNOs that follows after an aggregator-assisted EE within
the network managed by one MNO. The aggregator
ensures the exchange of low energy volumes of the EH-
SBSs through the SG, given that they are randomly
located within the macrocell area and cannot be con-
nected with power lines. Moreover, the aggregator pre-
vents extensive disclosure of private MNO information
to rival ones, e.g., traffic levels of all their EH-SBSs. As
the aggregator and MNOs have different characteristics
and rival interests, we propose a non-cooperative RE
double auction (DA) framework, namely RE-DA, for the
RE trading. DA has been used extensively to describe
resource allocation based on price regulations [23]–[26],
resource allocation in combination with power allocation
and interference control [27], e-markets [28], [29] and
energy exchange among micro-grids [30]. A DA energy
trading scheme is proposed in [11] for wireless net-
works, without making reference though to multi-MNO
implications. Our RE-DA framework regulates trading
of the harvested and stored RE at each EH-SBS of the
different MNOs, after an initial internal REE has taken
place among the EH-SBSs of the same MNO. Eventually,
the EH-SBSs of an MNO apply DA either having only
abundant or shortage in RE volume, thus acting only as
seller or buyer players, respectively. It is noted that a
seller EH-SBS enters the DA supplying the RE volume
at the price that best fits its individual future needs. The
aggregator acts as auctioneer, receiving a fit payoff.
• an evaluation of the schemes based on (i) the green energy
utilization, (ii) the reduction of expenses on SG energy
purchases and (iii) the satisfaction of all parties involved,
as they are main aims of our proposed solutions.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides the system model of our work and Section III refers
to the challenges it reveals. Sections IV and V describe our
EE proposals. Finally, Section VI presents the performance
results of our proposals and Section VII concludes our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In Fig. 1, we provide our system model, while the basic
notation of our paper can be found in Table I. In accordance
to Fig. 1(a), we assume a set of MNOs N = {1, .., n, .., N}
in a macrocell-sized area serving in time slot t a total set
K(t) = {1, .., k, ..,K(t)} of user equipment devices (UEs),
uniformly distributed in space. Each MNO n operates a two-
tier HetNet that is consisted of EH-BSs, i.e., BSs powered
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(b) Passively shared infrastructure.
Figure 1. Detailed system model.
by a hybrid use of an EHS, an ESS and the SG through
an aggregator. The small cell tier is consisted of a total set
L = {1, .., l, .., L} of EH-SBSs, uniformly distributed in the
studied area and owned by an InP. Each MNO n ∈ N manages
an νn percentage of L. The macrocell tier of each MNO n
is consisted of one EH-MBS, forming a total EH-MBS set
that is equal to the MNO one, N . The EH-MBSs are owned
and passively shared by N . As can be observed in Fig. 1(b),
the passive sharing includes sharing of energy and expenses
corresponding to the main supply, cooling system, shelter, ESS
and EHS. The operation and expenses corresponding to the
baseband unit, feeders and antennas are an individual and
exclusive responsibility of each MNO. Let the total set of
BSs be M = {1.., N, (N + 1) , .., (N + L)}. If m ≤ N , then
m ∈ M is an EH-MBS, while if N < m ≤ (N + L), an
EH-SBS. In case of RE shortage, all m ∈ M proceed to an
aggregator-aided energy trade with the SG [16].
We focus on the downlink (DL) side of the network, where
BS power consumption follows a linear model with regard
to traffic load volumes [31] and where orthogonal frequency
division multiple access is assumed, with transmission of
information in physical resource blocks (RBs). On this basis,
let χ(t) be a UE traffic pattern. The UE traffic load of an
Table I
BASIC NOTATION
N Set of MNOs, Set of EH-MBSs, with cardinality N , indexed by n
S Set of cooperative MNOs, with cardinality S, indexed by s, S ⊆ N
t Time slot with duration τ
K Set of UEs, with cardinality K, indexed by k
L Set of EH-SBSs provided by the InP, with cardinality L, indexed by l.
νn Percentage of L managed by MNO n.
M Set of EH-BSs, MBS or SBS, with cardinality M = N + L, indexed by m
m ≤ N : EH-MBS, N < m ≤ (N + L) : EH-SBS
Pm Power needs of m, (Watt)
P outm Output transmit power of m, (Watt)
P passm Shared power needs of m at min. non-zero P outm , (Watt)
P conm Non-shared power needs of m at min. non-zero P
out
m , (Watt)
hm Harvested RE at m, (Wh)
zm Stored RE at ESS of m, (Wh)
cb Unit price of buying energy from the SG, (C/Wh)
cs Unit price for selling energy to the SG, (C/Wh)
ca Unit price for practicing initial interior REE, (C/Wh)
g∗m Max. RE volume exchanged by m with the SG, (Wh)
e∗m Max. RE volume exchanged by m via REE, (Wh)
B Bankruptcy problem
VB Utility function for B
Ω Sum of RE for allocation with bankruptcy
X Set of seller EH-SBSs, with cardinality X , indexed by x, X ⊆ L
Y Set of buyer EH-SBSs, with cardinality Y , indexed by y, Y ⊆ L
−r RE supplied by indicated r, member of indicated set R, via IndREE, (Wh)
+l RE received by indicated r, member of indicated set R, via IndREE, (Wh)
ERr Claim/Reservation RE of indicated r, member of indicated set R, (Wh)
ΦRr Reservation price of indicated r, member of indicated set R
eRr Payoff RE volume of indicated r, member of indicated set R, (Wh)
φRr Trading price of indicated r, member of indicated set R
G Critical point of trading with double auction
Q Total RE volume traded with double auction, (Wh)
ADA Payoff allocated to the auctioneer of double auction
MNO n ∈ N can be described as χn(t) = κnχ(t), where
κn ∈  ++ for a slot t, forming a total UE set at t K(t),
with cardinality K(t) =
∑N
n=1 χn(t). Each UE k ∈ K(t)
connects to an m ∈ M that is owned or managed by its own
provider MNO and with which it has the best signal-to-noise
ratio, SNRkm(t). We calculate SNRkm(t) as [32]
SNRkm(t) = P
tx,sub
m +G
tx
m−PLkm(t)−FLkm−Nth−NF, (1)
where P tx,subm = 10log10 (P
tr
m / (12TRXmPRBm)) repre-
sents the power allocated to each subcarrier of EH-BS m
(dBm), with P trm being the maximum transmission power of
m (W), TRXm being the number of transceiver chains at
m and PRBm being the number of allocated RBs1 to m.
Moreover, in eq. (1), Gtxm denotes the antenna gain of m
(including feeder losses (dBi)) and PLkm(t) is the pathloss
between UE k and BS m at t (dB). Finally, FLkm represents
the slow fading losses (dB) as a random variable of log-normal
distribution, with zero mean deviation and a standard deviation
σm, Nth is the thermal noise and NF is the noise figure.
The guaranteed bit rate demand, k (Mb/s) of a UE k ∈
K(t), can be expressed in RBs as
wkm(t) =
∑
k inK
ζkm(t) ·  k
WRBm f(SNRkm(t))
, (2)
where WRBm is the bandwidth that corresponds to an RB pair
of m and f(SNRkm(t)) is the spectral efficiency of the link
1It is noted that 1 RB is equal to 12 subcarriers in the frequency domain
and 0.5 ms in the time domain.
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between k and m at slot t. Given that adaptive modulation and
coding is adopted over any radio link, we map the requested
data rate k and SNRkm(t) to a respective spectral efficiency
as indicated in [33, Table A.2]. We also denote with ζkm(t)
the association state of k with m at t, which is equal to 1
when k is associated to m and 0 otherwise.
Based on [31], we model the power needs Pm(t) of an
EH-BS m ∈ M at slot t as
Pm(t) = TRXm
(
P passm +ΔmP
out
m (t)
)
, P outm (t) =
∑K
k=1 wkm(t)
Wm
P trm ,
(3)
where Δm is the slope of load-dependent power consumption
and P outm is the output transmit power of BS m. P
out
m is
described as the portion of the maximum transmit power of
m, P trm , as it is defined by the occupied RB number of m
during t, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 wkm(t), and the total number of RBs,
Wm, that is allocated to m by default. The consideration of
the
∑K
k=1 wkm(t)
Wm
term was based on the assumption that P trm
is equally allocated to the each subcarrier and RB that are
available by default at the BS. Finally, P passm stands for the
total power consumption of m at minimum non-zero output
power. Based on [31], we consider that P passm = P
con
m /S,
where P conm represents the power needs of a non-shared BS
m at the minimum non-zero output power, while S is the
cardinality of the set S ⊆ N of MNOs who participate in
the passive sharing of m. When m ≤ |S|, i.e., when m is an
MBS, then, apparently, |S| > 1. Otherwise, |S| = 1.
The energy procurement source of an EH-BS m ∈ M is
controlled and changed accordingly by a charge control system
(CCS) that is able to measure and arrange energy availability
from each source. Aiming at achieving a purely green network
operation with reduced operational expenses, we assume the
hereafter described energy sources.
1) Energy harvesting (EH): It is the primary energy pro-
curement source for the EH-BSs and is either solar (harvested
with photovoltaic panels) or aeolian (harvested with wind
turbines). Solar energy has been opted for the energy hungry
MBSs, since its harvesting is periodic and reduces probability
for energy outages. However, we assume both solar and wind
RE source for SBSs to enhance chances of RE availability in
the whole network. We calculate the amount of harvested RE
hm(t) (J) at BS m for the duration τ of a slot t as [34], [35]
hm(t) =
{
PVm ·Hm · τ · (1− ηsol,m) · sin(2πτ/TRE), sun
1
2
·WNm · ρ ·A · v3 · Cm · τ, wind.
(4)
In the sun case of eq. (4), PVm is the number of photovoltaic
panels at BS m, Hm stands for the average solar generation
of the panel at m and in the studied area (Wh/m2/hour),
while ηsol,m ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage of panel RE losses due
to temperature, cleanness and shading, mismatching operation
of elements, wiring and aging [36]. Lastly, TRE is the period
of solar generation. In the wind case of eq. (4), WNm is the
number of wind turbines at m, ρ is the air density
(
kg/m3
)
and v is the wind velocity (m/s). A = πb2 is the area swept
by the turbine rotor blades
(
m2
)
, where b corresponds to the
rotor blade radius. Lastly, Cm is the power coefficient or rotor
efficiency and is a function of tip speed ratio and pitch angle.
2) ESS: Its utility is described as the storage of
abundant harvested RE, i.e., max {hm(t)− τPm(t), 0}, as
a provision for RE shortage events. Therefore, it is
the second energy procurement source for the EH-BS.
The RE volume that is stored in the ESS during slot
t is max {(hm(t− 1)− τPm(t− 1)) · (1− ηESS,m), 0}, where
ηESS,m ∈ [0, 1] is an energy loss factor due to battery
deficiencies [37]. However, if zm(t) is the energy available at
the ESS of m at the beginning of slot t, zm(t) has an upper and
lower bound. zm(t) is upper bounded by the maximum storage
capacity Zm atm. It is Zm = ΨmVmIm, where Ψm is the total
number of batteries composing the ESS (in serial connection)
of BS m, while Vm and Im is the nominal voltage and
capacity, respectively, of each battery. Each ESS battery is also
characterized by its depth of discharge, DOD, which prevents
the degradation of its health. Thus, zm(t) is both upper and
lower bounded with: (1−DOD) · Zm ≤ zm(t) ≤ Zm.
3) Aggregator and Smart grid (SG): SG connection via an
aggregator is assumed for every BS m ∈ M as the last energy
procurement source, as a countermeasure against RE outages
and so that MNOs can trade with the SG. EH-BSs trade an
energy amount gm either as a purchase from the SG at a price
cb (C/Wh) or as a sale to the SG at a price cs (C/Wh), with
cs ≤ cb. The maximum absolute value of gm is
|g∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)− τPm(t)∣∣ , (5)
where zm(t−) = max {(hm(t− 1)− τPm(t− 1)) · (1− ηESS,m), 0}
represents the ESS energy that BS m has at the beginning of
slot t, before any energy procurement takes place from it.
III. RE EXCHANGE (REE) AND CHALLENGES
Aiming at extending the prospects of cost and energy saving
in the multi-stakeholder deployment of our system model, we
suggest the inclusion of REE acts among the EH-BSs of each
tier, before a possible trade with the SG. In detail, we suggest
that REE acts occur if the sum of stored and abundant RE is
• sufficient to cover the energy needs of EH-BS m ∈ M,
i.e., τPm(t) ≤ hm(t) + zm(t−).
• insufficient to cover the energy needs of EH-BS m ∈ M,
i.e., τPm(t) > hm(t) + zm(t−).
Let em(t) (Wh) be the RE volume that m exchanges through
REE acts for slot t. The highest absolute value of em(t) is
|e∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)− τPm(t)∣∣ , (6)
while energy volume traded with the SG of eq. (5) becomes
|g∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)± e∗m(t)− τPm(t)∣∣ . (7)
Challenges are found on the extraction of the em(t) RE
volumes with an REE scheme that is, firstly, applicable to
multi-MNO and multi-tier network architectures, and, sec-
ondly, fairly regulates REE among the stakeholders. In order
to address this challenge, we study the REE prospects in our
system model as a two-branched case described as (i) the
passively shared EH-MBSs and (ii) the InP provided EH-SBSs.
For the first case, we formulate REE as a cooperative energy
sharing scheme via power lines for the energy transfer that
addresses fairness issues. The passively shared EH-MBSs have
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the fundamental role of providing seamless umbrella coverage,
while doing a green and economic energy management of
the utmost fairness for the owner MNOs. Thus, fairness in
sharing the harvested and stored RE volumes of the site’s EHS
and ESS, respectively, is a critical issue, as both group and
individual MNO profits have to be protected. Simple strategies,
such as equal allocation of the total RE volume or allocation
with demand magnitude priority could be easy solutions to
adopt and ultimately extract the em(t) RE volumes. However,
such strategies may result into a distribution that could be
not only energy and cost inefficient, but also unfair to some
MNOs. MNOs have to overcome any arisen inefficiency and
fairness issues and seek an energy neutral EH-MBS operation.
For the second case, we formulate REE as a non-cooperative
aggregator-assisted energy trading scheme of low complexity.
The EH-SBSs are overlaid in the whole macrocell area and an
REE act among them demands public reveal of information
on the individual MNO activity. However, MNOs may prefer
to keep this information private, especially when sharing of
the macrocell tier already reveals some of their characteris-
tics. MNOs could negotiate directly amongst them for the
encounter of a solution and the extraction of the em(t) RE
volumes. However, this can lead to strategy exposure and
hazard both their individual future energy planning and profits,
while multiple negotiations for multiple network elements with
energy needs increase the complexity of negotiations.
Fig. 2 describes our proposed energy procurement strategy
for the EH-MBSs and EH-SBSs. As can be observed, for the
passively shared EH-MBSs, we propose an approach, namely
RE-BG, that treats the abundant and stored RE as a predefined
entity that has to be completely allocated in em(t) RE volumes
to the passively shared EH-MBSs. RE-BG is executed at
the CCS on site. After the application of RE-BG, EH-MBSs
can trade energy with the SG, via the aggregator. For the
InP provided EH-SBSs, we propose an aggregator-assisted
approach, namely RE-DA, that runs in parallel with the RE-BG
scheme. RE-DA can be applied by EH-SBSs of the different
MNOs after the EH-SBSs have procured RE, firstly, from the
EHS and secondly, from the ESS of the site. Moreover, for an
inter-MNO REE to occur, we assume that an initial interior
REE, which is based on the least difference in the abundant
and lacked RE volume at the EH-SBSs of the same MNO, is
preceded. Thus, with RE-DA, MNOs carefully extract at the
CCS the information pieces they reveal to rival MNOs, i.e.,
the abundant or lacked RE at their site and respective unit
prices, which they communicate to the impartial aggregator.
For a decision, they take into consideration current and future
energy needs, as well as the profitability of their options. The
latter then extracts the traded multi-MNO em(t) RE volumes
and respective trading prices. After the application of RE-DA,
EH-SBSs can trade energy with the SG, via the aggregator.
IV. ENERGY SHARING AMONG EH-MBSS
As a result of the adopted passive sharing, MNOs share
an EHS, composed of solar panels, and an ESS along with
the equipment of their collocated MBSs. Then, the EH-MBSs
apply an REE scheme of sharing the harvested and stored RE
Figure 2. Suggested energy procurement order.
in order to ultimately achieve energy neutrality before trading
energy with the SG. RE transfer is implemented via power
lines that have been installed by the MNOs, with negligible
energy losses thanks to the short length of the power lines.
During daylight, when solar energy generation varies, and
at the beginning of a slot t, each shared EH-MBS makes an
estimation of its expected energy needs for the duration τ
of t. During night-time though, when solar EH is zero2, a
decision for the REE act is made based only on the stored RE.
Therefore, each shared EH-MBS estimates its energy needs
during a slot t′, which corresponds to a set of slots t 3. Based
on the extracted estimation for the daylight and night-time,
the shared CCS makes the energy management of the shared
EH-MBSs for the duration τ of t and τ ′ of t′, respectively.
We model the energy sharing problem among the shared
EH-MBSs, using cooperative game theory. In detail, we use a
bankruptcy game, according to which a specific entity needs
to be completely allocated among a specific group of players
[21]. Each player makes a claim on the entity. A utility function
is set for the game, which eventually allocates to each player
a part of the entity, i.e., the payoff.
Regarding the considered scenario, this entity, let Ω(t), is
the sum of (i) h(t), i.e., the RE that is collected from the shared
EHS and (ii) the available stored RE z(t−) at the shared ESS,
when the sum is either over-sufficient or insufficient to cover
the power needs P (t) of the passively shared EH-MBSs for the
duration τ of a slot t, i.e., τP (t) ≤ h(t) + z(t−) = Ω(t) and
τP (t) > h(t) + z(t−) = Ω(t), respectively. Entity Ω(t) has
to be fairly and completely provided to the EH-MBSs that are
passively shared by a set of MNOs S ⊆ N . The EH-MBSs,
or, as there is a one-to-one correspondence, their owner MNO,
of coalition S can be portrayed as the players of the game.
Each player s ∈ S claims an amount Es(t) = τPs(t) of the
entity Ω(t) so as to achieve an purely green operation of its
EH-MBS, s, with Ps(t) being defined as in eq. (3).
Thus, we have a bankruptcy problem, B(t) modeled as
B(t) =
{ (
Ω(t), Es(t) ∈  ++ × |S|+
)
: Ω(t) ≤∑|S|s=1 Es(t)
}
.
(8)
2It is noted that, in terms of simplicity, for periods of non-existent solar
energy generation, solar energy harvesting is zero.
3In terms of simplicity and without loss of generality, we continue the
analysis in the present section making reference to slot t.
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We define the utility function of the bankruptcy game,
VB(t), VB(t) : 2N ×  , which evaluates the bankruptcy
problem B(t) and associates it to a real value, as
VB(t) (S) =
{
min
{
Es∈S(t),Ω(t)−
∑
s/∈S Es(t)
}
,S = {s}
min
{∑
s∈S VB(t) (s) ,Ω(t)−
∑
s/∈S Es(t)
}
,S = {s} .
(9)
Eq. (9) practically represents the amount of RE that can
be allocated, after the non-participants in coalition S have
received their claim. Thus, in an individual act of MNO, i.e.,
S = {s}, the game value VB(t) (s) is equal to either the
total amount of its claim, Es(t), or the remaining amount of
Ω(t), after non-participant MNOs in S have taken their share.
Similarly, in a coalition with more than one participants, i.e.,
S = {s}, the game value VB(t) (S) can be either the sum
of individual act values VB(t) (s) or the remaining Ω(t), after
non-participant MNOs in S have satisfied their needs.
However, if VB(t) (S) <
(
Ω(t) − ∑s/∈S Es(t)), then
VB(t) (S) = 0. This is due to the fact that entity Ω(t)
needs to be totally allocated to the cooperative MNOs [21].
Consequently, when VB(t) (S) <
(
Ω(t) − ∑s/∈S Es(t)),
Ω(t) is insufficient to cover the energy needs of the total shared
system and the value of that game is 0.
In order to ensure a viable solution for the bankruptcy game,
the energy amounts that will be allocated to the participants in
a coalition S , i.e., the extracted payoffs, need to fulfill certain
constraints. Let es(VB(t)(S)) be the payoff of player s ∈ S
for participating in the B(t) with the utility function VB(t).
Then, es(VB(t)(S)) is the volume of Ω(t) that is allocated to
a player s ∈ S and is subjected to the following constraints:
• The sum of allocated payoffs should equal VB(t)(S):∑
s∈S es(VB(t)(S)) = VB(t)(S).
• The payoff of a player s in a coalition S should be
at least equal to the payoff of its stand-alone action:
es(VB(t)({s})) ≤ es(VB(t)(S)).
• A player s cannot receive a higher payoff than its claim,
so that fairness is preserved: 0 ≤ es(VB(t)(S)) ≤ Es(t).
We use Shapley Value (SV) to solve the problem, i.e., to
calculate the payoffs es(VB(t)(S)) of the described bankruptcy
game [22]. SV rewards a player s ∈ S with the SV payoff that
portrays its marginal contribution to the coalition value, based
on the utility function of the game. In the present case, SV
payoffs es(VB(t)(S)) represent the contribution in generating
Ω(t), when an S is formed and based on the utility function
VB(t)(S) of eq. (9). SV has four basic axioms [22]:
• Efficiency axiom:
∑
s∈S es(VB(t)(S)) = VB(t) (S).
• Dummy axiom: If a player s is such that VB(t) (S) =
VB(t) (S ∪ {s}), then for ∀S ′, S ′ = S − {s}, it is
es(VB(t)(S ′)) = 0.
• Symmetry axiom: If two players s1 and s2 are such that
VB(t) (S ∪ {s1}) = VB(t) (S ∪ {s2}), then for ∀S ′, S ′ =
S ∪ {s1, s2} it is es1(VB(t)(S ′)) = es2(VB(t)(S ′)).
• Additivity axiom: If V1 and V2 are characteristic func-
tions, then e (V1 + V2) = e (V1 + V2) = e (V1) + e (V2).
For the bankruptcy game, the efficiency axiom of SV remains
valid when the game is defined by the player set, i.e., coalition
S. The remaining axioms remain valid for the proposed game.
SV has an impact as a solution to the described problem
since it displays a player’s worth in the studied game, when
the player joins coalition S . Thus, we calculate the payoff
of each player s ∈ S via the canonical definition of the SV
payoff, which, based on the utility function VB of eq. (9), is
es
(
VB(t) (S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N\{s}
|S|! (|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
[
VB(t) (S ∪ {s})− VB(t) (S)
]
.
(10)
Due to the different coalition forms of N EH-MBSs ex-
amined, the computational complexity of our scheme RE-BG
is O(2N ) [38]. Given a large |N |, the scheme’s complexity
increases tremendously. In this case though, it is acceptable as
the number of collocated EH-MBSs, N cannot be too high.
V. ENERGY TRADING AMONG EH-SBSS
MNOs lease from an InP EH-SBSs that are connected to
the SG via an aggregator. MNOs adopt an REE scheme of
aggregator-assisted energy trading among their EH-SBSs, so
as to achieve energy neutrality before any trades with the SG.
At the beginning of a slot t, each EH-SBS estimates its
expected energy needs and harvested RE for the duration
τ of t. Taking into account the available stored RE at the
ESS at the beginning of t, the CCS of the site calculates the
RE volume that the EH-SBS is able to supply or demand
at a trade. The impartial aggregator gets the information and
arranges an initial interior REE among the EH-SBSs managed
by the same MNO. Buyer EH-SBSs are matched to the seller
ones with the least difference in requested and supplied RE
volume, at the cost of the same price ca ≤ cb (C/Wh), until
there are no remains of requested or supplied RE. After the
initial interior REE, the CCS calculates the RE volume that
the EH-SBS supplies or demands for a trade with EH-SBSs of
other MNOs, along with a respective price. This information
is communicated to the impartial aggregator, who extracts the
energy trading volume and price for each EH-SBS and for slot
t, and its own payoff. Payments are executed through monetary
transactions among the involved parties. We assume that the
energy transfer is managed by the aggregator on a cloud level
and that the SG delivers RE volumes to recipient EH-SBSs
with energy shortage having negligible energy losses.
We model the energy trading problem of the EH-SBSs man-
aged by various MNOs using non-cooperative game theory.
In detail, we use the concept of double auction (DA), which
is applicable to cases where multiple sellers and buyers are
active [22]. In a DA, each seller and each buyer supplies and
demands, respectively, a number of items. All sellers report
a price for the item, i.e., the asking price, while all buyers
propose another price, i.e., the bidding price. A trading point
among sellers and buyers is eventually determined based on
the demanded and supplied quantities of the traded item, as
well as from the asking and bidding prices. The DA can be
executed in a distributed manner or centrally by an auctioneer.
Regarding the considered scenario, we simulate as DA an
aggregator-assisted energy trading among EH-SBSs that are
managed by different MNOs. We set the harvested and stored
RE, as well as the RE volumes exchanged with initial interior
REE, as the trade item of DA, the EH-SBSs as the DA buyers
and sellers and the aggregator as the DA auctioneer. The total
set of EH-SBSs, L = 1, .., l, .., L, is consisted of
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• EH-SBSs with abundant RE in comparison to their energy
needs τPl(t), i.e., τPl(t) ≤ hl(t) + zl(t−)− −l (t) + +l (t),
• EH-SBSs with RE shortage in comparison to their energy
needs τPl(t), i.e., τPl(t) > hl(t)+ zl(t−)− −l (t)+ +l (t)),
where −l (t) and 
+
l (t) are the RE volumes provided and
received with the initial interior REE, respectively.
The RE volume El(t) that each EH-SBSs l has in abundance
or shortage corresponds to the reservation RE volume that the
EH-SBS wants to supply or demand, respectively, with
El(t) = hl(t) + zl(t
−)− −l (t) + +l (t)− τPl(t). (11)
Based on El(t), the auctioneer-aggregator separates L to or-
dered sets of seller and buyer EH-SBSs, X and Y , respectively:
• If El(t) ≥ 0, then EH-SBS l is a seller and l ∈ X . We will
hereafter refer to the El(t) of a seller as EXl (t) = El(t).
• If El(t) < 0, then EH-SBS l is a buyer and l ∈ Y . We will
hereafter refer to the El(t) of a buyer as EYl (t) = |El(t)|.
Along with El(t), each EH-SBS l ∈ L communicates to
the auctioneer-aggregator as well its asking or bidding price
(C/Wh) to reserve its participation in the DA. Let ΦXl be
the reservation asking price of a seller l ∈ X and ΦYl the
reservation bidding price of a buyer l ∈ Y . Let us note that
none of the buyers or sellers splits its volume so as to ask
different reservation price for each category. Values of ΦXl
and ΦYl are extracted based on a different strategy.
A. Sellers
Each seller EH-SBS l ∈ X is characterized by a utility
function, UXl (t), which values the significance of its El(t) in
relation to its own energy needs. We set
UXl (t) = δ
X
l (t)·ln
(
1 + EXl (t)
)
+ΦXl (t)·
(
hl(t) + zl(t
−)− −l (t) + +l (t)− EXl (t)
)
,
(12)
where δXl (t) =
τPl(t+1)
hl(t)+zl(t
−−−
l
(t)+
+
l
(t))+hl(t+1)
τPl(t)
hl(t)+zl(t
−−−
l
(t)+
+
l
(t))
> 0 is a prefer-
ence value, which indicates the value of EXl (t) for the current
and next slot, t and (t+ 1), respectively. Thus, the first part
of eq. (12) represents the value of EXl (t) for a future private
use by seller l ∈ X . The second part of eq. (12) corresponds
to the revenues that l ∈ X can obtain during slot t by
selling EXl (t) at a price Φ
X
l (t). U
X
l (t) is strictly concave, i.e.,
∂2UXl (t)(E
X
l (t))
∂(EXl (t))
2 < 0 and has a unique optimal that maximizes
its value. Hence, for a strictly defined ΦXl (t) and a δ
X
l (t),
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the best values
of EXl (t) and Φ
X
l (t), E
X ,∗
l (t) and Φ
X ,∗
l (t), respectively. In
eq. (11), we calculated EX ,∗l (t). Given the E
X ,∗
l (t), Φ
X ,∗
l (t)
can be found for seller l when ∂U
X
l (t)(E
X
l (t))
∂EXl (t)
= 0, with
ΦX ,∗l (t) =
δXl (t)
1 + EX ,∗l (t)
. (13)
B. Buyers
Each buyer EH-SBSs l ∈ Y makes a reservation to buy an
RE volume El(t)Y for slot t to ensure energy neutrality for t.
We assume that each buyer l ∈ Y extracts a random value
for its reservation bidding price ΦYl . However, we assume that
cs ≤ ΦYl (t) ≤ ΦYl (t) ≤ cb. The restriction implies that the
bidding price of the buyer must be higher than the offered
prices by the sellers and the SG and, at the same time, lower
that the price cb at the cost of which it can buy SG energy.
C. Auctioneer-aggregator
As the DA auctioneer, the aggregator extracts the sets
of seller and buyer EH-SBSs, after applying first the initial
interior REE among the EH-SBSs of one MNO, as described
in Section V. The aggregator then extracts the seller and buyer
sets, X and Y , respectively, based on their reservation RE
volumes, EXl (t) and E
Y
l (t), and prices, Φ
X
l (t) and Φ
Y
l (t). We
assume that EXl (t), E
Y
l (t), Φ
X
l (t) and Φ
Y
l (t) are static, i.e.,
sellers buyers cannot change their values, once they announce
them to the aggregator. Based on the above, the aim of the
aggregator is to determine for slot t
• the set of winner seller EH-SBSs, the final RE volumes
they have to supply, eXl (t), as well as the trading selling
price, φXl (t), at the cost of which they have to sell e
X
l (t).
• the set of winner buyer EH-SBSs, the final RE volumes
they will purchase, eYl (t), as well as the trading selling
price, φYl (t), at the cost of which they have to buy e
Y
l (t).
The aggregator takes into account the following restrictions
•
∑
l∈X e
X
l (t) ≤ EXl (t), ∀l ∈ X , which ensures that none
of the sellers sells more energy than it supplies,
•
∑
l∈Y e
Y
l (t) ≤ EYl (t), ∀l ∈ Y , which ensures that none
of the buyers buys more energy than it demands,
• eXl (t), e
Y
l (t) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L, which reassures the exchange
of a non-zero energy volume,
• cs ≤ φXl (t) ≤ φYl (t) ≤ cb, which ensures the profitability
of the DA trades in relation to ones with the SG.
D. The auction
For the extraction of the aggregator’s final decision, our
proposed scheme, namely RE-DA, fulfills the presented aims
and restrictions through the hereafter described procedure.
1) Step 1: The aggregator applies a Vickrey-like auction
on each market side, so that buyers and sellers report their
reservation prices [22], [28]. Without loss of generality and
with the same prices being randomly sorted, the aggregator
sorts the reservation prices of sellers ∀l ∈ X and buyers ∀l ∈
Y in ascending and descending order, respectively. Let X and
Y be the cardinalities of sets X and Y , respectively, and j and
i the indices for the ordered X and Y , respectively. It is
ΦXj=1(t) ≤ ... ≤ ΦXj (t) ≤ ΦXj=X(t), (14)
and
ΦYi=1(t) ≥ ... ≥ ΦYi (t) ≥ ΦYi=Y (t). (15)
The reservation prices with the corresponding RE volumes
are organized as in Fig. 3. The intersection point of the RE
volumes and prices of seller and buyer EH-SBSs indicates the
critical point of trading G. The G is the intersection point of
the jth seller and the ith buyer EH-SBS. In accordance with
the Vickrey auction rules, (j − 1) are the winner sellers that
trade with (i− 1) winner buyers. Two cases are discriminated
that can reassure the existence of G:
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Figure 3. Typical DA case between the ordered sets of buyer EH-SBSs, Y
and seller EH-SBSs, X , with display of their DA reservation RE volumes and
prices, the critical trade point G and the DA payoff of the aggregator, ADA.
• Asking and bidding prices satisfy ΦYi+1(t) ≤ ΦXj (t) ≤
ΦYi (t) and aggregate energy supply and demand satisfy∑j=j−1
j=1 E
X
j (t) ≤
∑i=i
i=1 E
Y
i (t) ≤
∑j=j
j=1 E
X
j (t).
• Asking and bidding prices satisfy Φ
X
j (t) ≤ ΦYi (t) ≤
ΦXj+1(t) and aggregate energy supply and demand satisfy∑i=i−1
i=1 E
Y
i (t) ≤
∑j=j
j=1 E
X
j (t) ≤
∑i=i
i=1 E
Y
i (t).
In both cases, the market is cleared.
2) Step 2: The cleared prices of winner sellers and buyers
for t, φXj′ (t) with j
′ = 1, .., j−1 and φYi′ (t) with i′ = 1, .., i−1,
respectively are set by the auctioneer-aggregator as{
φXj′ (t) = Φ
X
j (t),
φYi′ (t) = Φ
Y
i (t).
(16)
The cleared RE volume is defined differently for each seller
and buyer EH-SBS for t based on the sum of reservation RE
volumes until G. Two cases are extracted:
• Case Overdemand
(∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t) ≥
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
)
,
where the aggregated demanded RE from winner buyers
exceeds the supplied by winner sellers RE sum. In
this case, all winner sellers sell their total supplied RE
volume, i.e., eXj′ (t) = E
X
j′ (t), j
′ = 1, .., j − 1, at the
cleared seller price φXj′ (t) of eq. (16). However, all winner
buyers with indices i′ = 1, .., i − 1 buy at the cleared
buyer price φYi′ (t) of eq. (16) an RE volume e
Y
i′ (t) with
eYi′(t) = E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i− 1 . (17)
In the case that EYi′ (t) <
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i−1 ,
winner buyer i′ pays for a winning traded en-
tity eYi′ (t) = E
Y
i′ (t), while the remaining RE,∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i−1 − EYi′ (t) is allocated and
bought equally by the remaining winner buyer EH-SBSs.
• Case Oversupply
(∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t) ≤
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
)
,
where the aggregated supplied RE from winner seller EH-
SBSs exceeds the demanded by winner buyer EH-SBSs
RE sum. In this case, all winner buyer EH-SBSs buy
their total demanded RE volume, i.e., eYi′ (t) = E
Y
i′ (t),
i′ = 1, .., i − 1, at the cleared buyer price φYi′ (t) of
eq. (16). However, all winner seller EH-SBSs with indices
j′ = 1, .., j − 1 sell at the cleared seller price φXj′ (t) of
eq. (16) an RE volume eXj′ (t) with
eXj′(t) = E
X
j′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j − 1 . (18)
In the case that EXj′ (t) <
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j−1 ,
winner seller j′ sells a winning traded entity
eXj′ (t) = E
X
j′ (t), while the remaining RE,
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j−1 − EXj′ (t) is allocated and
sold equally by the remaining winner seller EH-SBSs.
3) Step 3: The payoff compensation of the auctioneer-
aggregator, ADA(t) is then calculated based on the total
traded RE volume Q(t) among the winner EH-SBSs, with
Q(t) = min
⎛
⎝i
′=i−1∑
i′=1
EYi′ (t),
j′=j−1∑
j′=1
EXj′ (t)
⎞
⎠ . (19)
Thus, we define the ADA(t) at each DA event equal to
ADA(t) =
(
ΦYi (t)− ΦXj (t)
) ·Q(t), (20)
where ΦXj (t) and Φ
Y
i (t) are determined at G. Practically, in
order to extract ADA(t), we consider the difference between
the (i) trading prices, ΦXj (t) and Φ
Y
i (t), at critical point G,
and (ii) the sum of reservation energies of seller and buyer
EH-SBSs until G and winner seller and buyer EH-SBSs.
4) Step 4: After the extraction of the payoff RE volumes
and prices, the values are returned to the winner seller and
buyer EH-SBSs. Payments are then implemented through
monetary transactions among MNOs and aggregator, while the
latter proceeds to energy transfer through the SG.
The complexity of RE-DA is O(L2). With RE-DA, the
aggregator firstly executes the initial internal REE for each
MNO. In the worst case, this is a greedy scheme of con-
secutive quick-sort procedures and matchings for ∀l ∈ L
with complexity O(L2). Then, each EH-SBS locally calculates
its reservation RE volume and price, while the auctioneer-
aggregator quick-sorts the seller set X and the buyer set Y . The
local calculation at the EH-SBSs is of negligible complexity.
The quick-sort complexity is O(nlog(n)), with n = L, i.e.,
the maximum cardinality of X or Y . Finally, the encounter
of G and the final payoff extraction that follow are both
characterized by an O(n) complexity, with n = L2 in the worst
case scenario. Therefore, the complexity of RE-DA is O(L2).
E. Analysis on RE-DA
The presents section investigates the properties of the pro-
posed RE-DA scheme, in terms of the adopted DA.
Proposition 1: RE-DA is strategy proof with respect to
reservation prices.
Proof: We will show that none of the players has a reason to
misreport their reservation prices to EH-SBSs of rival MNOs.
A seller EH-SBS may (i) misreport its reservation price
asking one higher than ΦXj (t), (ii) misreport its reservation
price asking one lower than ΦXj (t), or (iii) supply a reservation
RE volume lower than EXj (t). In the first case, the seller
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risks its participation in the DA, as its asking price may be
a lot higher than the bidding ones of the buyers. Also, the
trading price might be determined by another seller, while the
seller itself cannot have knowledge of other players’ private
reservation prices so as to ask the ideally high price. In any
case, the seller asks the best price for its supplied RE volume,
based on its utility function. Thus, the seller has no reason to
ask a price higher than ΦXj (t). In the case that a seller under-
reports its reservation price, it does not value sufficiently the
RE volume it is willing to supply. This is proved by its concave
utility function of eq. (12). Thus, the seller has no reason to
ask a price lower than ΦXj (t). In the last case, the seller does
not have a clear vision if under-reporting its reservation RE
volume is a more beneficial decision, as the set of winner EH-
SBSs is determined by another BS. Therefore, the seller has
no reason to under-report its reservation RE volume.
A buyer EH-SBS may (i) overbid its reservation price asking
one higher than ΦYj (t), (ii) underbid its reservation price
asking one lower than ΦXj (t), or (iii) request a higher than
EYi (t) reservation RE volume. Regarding the two first cases,
buyer EH-SBSs cannot over- or under- estimate their bidding
price, as bidding prices are extracted randomly. However, a
buyer may overestimate the demanded RE volume, as no
restriction is preserved from our scheme. This decision does
not affect the sellers though, as they value appropriately their
supplied RE volumes. Based on the above, our proposed
scheme is strategy proof with respect to reservation prices.
Proposition 2: RE-DA is weakly budget balanced.
Proof: A DA scheme is weakly budget balanced if the sum
of sellers’ and buyers’ payments is a non-negative number.
In RE-DA, buyers and sellers are ordered in descending and
ascending order, respectively, until G is encountered. Thus,
buyer EH-SBSs of RE-DA trade at price φY(t)i′ which is always
higher than the one of sellers, i.e., φX (t)j′ . The difference be-
tween them though is used in eq. (20) for the extraction of the
payoff compensation of the auctioneer-aggregator, ADA(t).
ADA(t) is always non-negative and equal to the difference of
the buyers’ payment and sellers’ compensation. Based on the
above, RE-DA is weakly budget balanced.
Proposition 3: RE-DA is individually rational.
Proof: A DA is characterized as individually rational when
individual agents are attracted to voluntarily participate in it,
because they expect non-negative ex-ante profits. A seller EH-
SBS is willing to supply an RE volume EXj (t) at the cost of
a ΦXj (t), provided that it does not affect negatively its future
activity. However, this is taken into consideration by the seller
EH-SBS when it extracts ΦXj (t) for a specific RE volume
that maximizes its utility function (eq. (12)). In addition, the
cleared trading price is always higher than the reservation one,
ΦXj (t) thanks to the sorting. Thus, the seller’s profitability is
ensured. Finally, a seller EH-SBS participates in the DA if and
only if its asking price is higher than the one it can ask from
the SG market, i.e., ΦXj (t) ≥ cs. Thus, seller’s profitability
is ensured again. A buyer EH-SBS demands an RE volume
EYi (t) at the cost of a bidding price Φ
Y
i (t), which is not
necessarily the best one possible for them. A buyer EH-SBS
though cannot participate in the DA unless its ΦYi (t) is lower
than the one it trades with the SG, i.e., ΦYi (t) ≥ cb. This
ensures the profitability of its action. Finally, no seller and
buyer EH-SBS is burdened with any cost so as to participate in
the DA, as the auctioneer-aggregator receives its payoff from
the auction act. Based on the above, no seller or buyer EH-
SBS has a negative profit by participating in the DA. Hence,
RE-DA is individually rational for the EH-SBSs.
Proposition 4: RE-DA is asymptotically efficient with re-
spect to the number of players.
Proof: For buyers and sellers, the DA payoff to the auctioneer-
aggregator, ADA(t) is perceived as the total efficiency loss
in a DA transaction. However, the auctioneer-aggregator may
have specific requests with regard to the payoff it wishes to
receive. Therefore, we evaluate the efficiency of the method
from both perspectives in Section VI-B. In order to do that,
we use an efficiency indicator of the game, ef(t), defined as:
ef(t) =
(
ADA(t)
F1 + F2 + F3
)−1
(21a)
where F1 =
i′=i−1∑
i′=1
(
φY
i′ (t)− ΦYi (t)
)
· EY
i′ (t), (21b)
F2 =
j′=j−1∑
j′=1
(
φXj′ (t)− ΦXj (t)
)
· EXj′ (t), (21c)
F3 = ADA(t). (21d)
In eq. (21a), the denominator of eq. (21a) represents the total
DA market value, with the consideration of all trading entities,
i.e., the reservation and trading RE volumes and prices of
winner sellers and buyers in eqs. (21b) and (21c), as well as
the payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator in eq. (21d). From the
players’ perspective, RE-DA is favored when ef(t) diverges
from 0. However, from the perspective of the auctioneer-
aggregator, an RE-DA trade is efficient when ef(t) has a
value close to 0, while its payoff from the DA is over a
certain percentage λ(t) = ADA(t)∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)φ
Y
i′ (t)
. In Fig. 9 of
the following section, we display that RE-DA becomes more
efficient when more players participate in it. However, the
efficiency is upper bounded by λ(t).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the present section, we introduce in Section VI-A the
parameters we used for building our simulation scenario and
for evaluating the performance of our proposals, while in
Section VI-B, we present the relative extracted results.
A. Simulation scenario
We study a macrocell-sized urban area in Barcelona, Spain,
where N = 3 MNOs are active with a HetNet as in Fig. 1(a).
Each MNO owns 1 EH-MBS and passively shares it with the
other MNOs. MNO n = 1, 2, 3 manages the operation of 2,
10 and 13 InP provided EH-SBSs (L = 25), respectively. A
10 MHz bandwidth and SNRth = −10 dB are used [33].
We use κn = 0.3, 1.0, 1.3 for n = 1, 2, 3, respectively, unless
otherwise stated, and a χ(t) of users as in [31]. A UE k has
a random bit rate demand k = {1024, 512, 256} kb/s.
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Figure 4. RE Generation vs. Time, June 21st, Barcelona, Spain.
Table II
SYSTEM PARAMETER VALUES
Parameter Value
Nth -174 dBm
NF 5 dB
Solar radiation 5.14 kWh/m2/day, BCN, Jun.
ηsol,m 14%
TRE 24 h
ρ 1.1849 kg/m3
b 0.5 m
DOD 0.8
cb 0.10 C/kWh
cs cb/100
ca cb/100
m ≤ N N < m ≤ M
P trm 20 W 0.13 W
TRXm 6 2
Gtxm 15 dBi 5 dBi
PLk,m 128.1+37.6logDk,m 140+36.7logDk,m
Δm 4.7 4
P conm 130 W 6.8 W
PVm 6 1
WNm 0 1
Ψm 3 1
Vm 48 V 12 V
Im 150 Ah 28 Ah
ηESS,m 15% 15%
EH- MBSs and SBSs use solar panels of 4 kW and 100 W,
respectively. EH-SBSs are solar powered to a β = 0.6 ratio
for each n ∈ N , unless otherwise stated. Each remaining EH-
SBS m uses an 100 W wind turbine, with power coefficient
Cm ∈ [0.38, 0.45] [35]. Statistical data are used for the
wind velocity value v [39]. All ESSs are consisted of lithium
batteries with initial charge around the (1−DOD) level.
We study the best day of the year in terms of solar insolation
(June 21st). For RE-BG, we focus on a period slot τ ′ between
20:00-07:00, when no solar RE is generated. For RE-DA,
we assume slots of τ = 1 h throughout the day, with EH-
SBS having RE harvesting profiles of Fig. 4. The remaining
simulation parameters are portrayed in Table II [31], [33], [36].
We compare the proposed RE-BG with (i) Equal allocation
(EQ), where each EH-MBS n ∈ N gets an equal share of the
shared RE and (ii) Prioritized-claim allocation (PC), where
EH-MBSs receive their complete claim of RE in a descending
order. We assess the methods based on the ensured hours of SG
independence (hours) and their fairness in energy allocation
based on the Jain’s fairness index J . With αn defined as the
ratio of bought SG energy to each EH-MBS’s claim, it is
J =
(∑
n∈N αn
)2
|N |∑n∈N α2n . (22)
We compare the proposed RE-DA to the cases when the
set L of EH-SBSs is powered by (i) the SG only (SG-only),
(ii) its individual EHS, ESS and the SG (NoREE), while no
REE scheme is applied, and (iii) its individual EHS, ESS, an
REE act in the form of RE-DA, without the initial internal
REE, among a single-MNO managed infrastructure and the
SG (IndREE). We use for the comparison an indicator
γ(t) =
∑m=N+L
m=N gm(t)|studied scheme∑m=N+L
m=N gm(t)|SG−only
(23)
to estimate the SG energy procurements. Thus, γ repre-
sents the ratio of SG energy procurements in each studied
scheme, gm|studied scheme, to the ones in the SG-only case,
gm(t)|SG−only . We also assess the normalized payoff distri-
bution produced for the winner sellers and the auctioneer-
aggregator and evaluate RE-DA’s efficiency based on ef(t).
Finally, the profitability of each MNO individually from the
proposed schemes is evaluated in terms of the created costs.
B. Performance results
In order to display the energy benefits of MNOs with RE-
BG, in Fig. 5 we evaluate the hours of SG-independence an
EH-MBS n has with the en
(
VB(t) (N )
)
payoff it receives
from the shared ESS. Figs. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) depict and
compare the performance of EQ, PC and proposed RE-BG,
respectively4. According to Fig. 5(a), n = 2 and 3 use their
RE payoff for 8 h, while during the 9th hour, they need the
SG to continue operating. n = 1 though is SG-independent
during all night hours, while a part of its RE remains unused.
This occurs because n = 1 gets the same amount of RE as
n = 2 and 3, even though its traffic volume is lower. For
fairness issues though, the stored RE should be exploited to
the maximum by all EH-MBSs sharing the ESS. This does
not comply with the performance of neither EQ, nor PC, as
can be observed for the latter in Fig. 5(b). In detail, with PC,
n = 2, 3 procure energy from the ESS all night long, since
they have the biggest claim and, thus, are awarded with their
total RE claim. n = 1 is at disadvantage, since its payoff
corresponds to no more than 5 h of SG-independence. Unlike
EQ and PC, RE-BG allocation offers a satisfying number of
SG-independent hours to all cooperative EH-MBSs. According
to Fig. 5(c), when RE-BG is applied, between 20:00-07:00,
it ensures to all EH-MBSs SG-independence for 9 h. They
then use the remains of their allocated RE payoff and obtain
their energy deficits from the SG. In total, RE-BG offers a
more balanced period of green network operation to all MNOs,
since it considers both their cumulative energy needs and their
marginal contribution to completely allocate the stored RE.
In Fig. 6 we see the effects of MNO traffic volumes on
each allocation method’s fairness, based on their Jain’s fairness
4Harvested RE from the shared EHS during daylight was sufficient for the
individual EH-MBSs needs and thus has not been included in the figures.
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Figure 5. Monitoring of energy for different energy sharing methods.
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(b) Different traffic load peaks for n = 1 and n = 2, 3.
Figure 6. Jain’s fairness index, J , (i) for the studied energy sharing methods, EQ, PC and RE-BG, (ii) for varied traffic loads, κ1 and (iii) peaks of n = 1.
index, J . In detail, we vary traffic load factor κ1, while κ2 and
κ3 remain unchanged. We also consider similar and different
traffic load peaks of MNOs n = 1 and n = 2, 3 in Fig.
6(a) and Fig. 6(b), respectively. We notice that J of RE-
BG remains close to 1 irrespective of traffic load volumes or
peak differentiations in both figures, since it considers each
player’s contribution to storing RE. Also, compared to its
counterparts, RE-BG performs better. EQ performs closer to
RE-BG when traffic load peaks are similar in Fig. 6(a), mainly
for κ1 > 1. This is when MNO traffic volumes become more
similar and all allocated RE payoffs are consumed during the
night. However, when peaks are different in Fig. 6(b), fairness
of EQ deteriorates since traffic load differences among MNOs
are intensified. Lastly, PC allocation is far below EQ and RE-
BG in both figures, as there is always an EH-MBS in the
need of SG energy. PC though performs better when traffic
peaks are different in Fig. 6(b). This is because, when EH-
MBS n = 1 receives its payoff for its high peak traffic load,
MNOs n = 2, 3 are in their low peak traffic load and thus,
their EH-MBSs use RE to a high degree. In the reverse case
that MNO n = 1 is in its low peak traffic load and thus has
lower needs in RE than n = 2, 3, the EH-MBSs of the latter
have more remaining RE to share for their RE needs.
We display the benefits of MNOs with RE-DA, in Fig. 7
using the indicator γ(t) of eq. (23) for the comparison of
NoREE, IndREE our RE-DA to the SG-only operation of
EH-SBSs in L, during a day. Between 07:00-14:00, the EH-
SBSs consume their harvested and stored RE and then use
SG energy in all study cases. However, SG purchases are still
considerably reduced, up to 80% at 11:00 when γ = 2. When
γ = 0 between 14:00-19:00, in all cases, EH-SBSs consume
only harvested RE and store some in their ESSs. After 19:00,
IndREE coincides with NoREE until 22:00 consuming SG
energy as well. With NoREE, the EH-SBSs cannot exchange
RE amongst themselves. With IndREE, despite the fact that
ESSs of both solar and aeolian EH-SBSs have abundant stored
RE, no REE acts take place as MNO traffic load volumes are
still considerable, making EH-SBSs reserved towards selling
RE. Nevertheless, IndREE acts then become more intense,
especially after 23:00, when traffic load volumes are low and
there are EH-SBSs with abundant harvested (mainly aeolian)
and stored RE. In contrast to its counterparts, RE-DA ensures
SG independence for the system after 19:00 and until 04:00.
RE-DA overcomes any reservation towards selling energy with
the initial interior REE among the EH-SBSs of the same
MNO. Trades with EH-SBSs of rival MNOs further reduce
SG expenses, especially when MNO traffic load volumes are
low. In the course of a day, NoREE, IndREE and RE-DA
reduce significantly the sum of SG energy purchases, reaching
a 34%, 31% and 12% of the SG-only case, respectively, while
a further 63% and 60% reduction is achieved by RE-DA in
comparison to NoREE and IndREE, respectively.
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Figure 7. 24-hour evaluation of SG energy purchases based on ratio γ(t) for
the (i) NoREE, (ii) IndREE and (iii) RE-DA energy procurement schemes.
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Figure 8. Normalised total daily DA (i) cost for winner buyer EH-SBSs, (ii)
payoff of winner seller EH-SBSs, and (iii) payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator,
vs. the ratio of solar powered SBSs, β.
The percentage β of solar EH-SBSs affects RE availability
at EH-SBSs and, thus, RE-DA profitability for the stake-
holders. Thus, in Fig. 8, we display the total normalized
daily DA payoff (i.e., cost)
∑t=TRE
t=1
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 e
Y
i′ (t)φ
Y
i′ (t) of
winner buyer EH-SBSs, the total normalized daily DA payoff∑t=TRE
t=1
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 e
X
j′(t)φ
X
j′(t) of winner seller EH-SBSs and
the total normalized daily DA payoff
∑t=TRE
t=1 ADA(t) of the
auctioneer-aggregator, for varying β. As can be observed, no
profits or costs are created with RE-DA when β = 0 and
β = 1, as EH-SBSs have homogeneous EH profiles for these
β values. Hence, no RE-DA trades take place. For β = {0, 1}
though, RE-DA is applied, with the payoff distribution among
winner seller EH-SBSs and auctioneer-aggregator being in-
tensely uneven occasionally. When β ≤ 0.5, the trades among
EH-SBSs of rival MNOs are considerably fewer in comparison
to the case β > 0.5. For β ≤ 0.5, the majority of EH-SBSs are
wind-powered and therefore, during the night, power the solar
ones, primarily with an initial internal REE. In daylight, the
reverse happens. RE-DA trades with EH-SBSs of other MNOs
take place in the early morning hours, when some ESSs may
not be charged. The remaining seller EH-SBSs though, have
enough abundant energy and, based on eq. (13), propose not
considerably high asking prices. Thus, in Fig. 8, a similar
distribution of the buyers’ expenses is mostly encountered
between the seller EH-SBSs and the auctioneer-aggregator.
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Figure 9. Efficiency of RE-DA trades based on mean ef vs. ratio β.
When β > 0.5, the majority of EH-SBSs are solar powered
and EH is distributed throughout the day. At the same time,
there are aeolian EH-SBSs to supply RE when solar EH is low
or non-available and to allow more frequent RE-DA trades
among EH-SBSs of rival MNOs. This explains the higher
expenses of buyer EH-SBSs when β = 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9.
RE-DA trades occur mainly during low-traffic hours, when
aeolian RE compensates energy deficits of solar EH-SBSs.
However, seller reservation prices are lower than the average
buyer ones, creating thus the vast gap noticed in the figure for
β = 0.8, 0.9. It can be said that mediocre β values allows
REE with RE-DA, reducing the SG expenses with satisfying
payoff for the auctioneer-aggregator.
As β affects the number of winner sellers and buyers, in
Fig. 9, we study its effect on the efficiency of RE-DA, based
on the mean ef value of eq. (21a). Our method’s efficiency
is also evaluated in relation to threshold values λ(t) that the
auctioneer-aggregator may impose so as to execute RE-DA. In
Fig. 9, when no limitation is imposed by the aggregator, i.e.,
λ = 0, the method is more efficient for 0.2 ≤ β ≤ 0.6. This
means that, for λ = 0, the more diverse the RE sources at the
EH-SBSs are, the more equal the payoff distribution among
seller EH-SBSs and the auctioneer-aggregator is. Thus, the
mean ef diverges from 0, i.e., RE-DA becomes more efficient.
ef has the highest value for β = 0.6, since for this β value,
more players participate in and eventually trade with RE-DA.
Therefore, for this case, the method is asymptotically efficient
with respect to the number of RE-DA players. However, our
method’s efficiency is limited by thresholds λ(t) of higher
values. In order to satisfy the requests of the auctioneer-
aggregator for high λ(t), either considerably wind- or solar-
powered dominated infrastructure is needed. In these cases,
there are periods of time during a day, when available RE at
seller EH-SBSs is enough to over-cover the energy needs of
their MNO’s network and trade energy with EH-SBSs of rival
MNOs with large profit margin for the auctioneer-aggregator.
Otherwise, the requests of the latter cannot be satisfied and
RE-DA is totally prevented. Once again though, when RE-
DA is allowed, its efficiency is higher when more players
participate in and eventually trade with it. As a conclusion,
low λ thresholds are important for RE-DA, while player EH-
SBSs need diverse RE-sources to achieve trades.
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Figure 10. Monthly MNO costs created by the proposed and traditional
methods.
In Fig. 10, we show the monthly costs created by our
proposed approaches’ individual and combined application in
the studied area and compare them with the adoption or not
of passive sharing and with the SG-only case. In the figure,
green shades represent the application of both passive sharing
and RE-BG at the EH-MBS site. Red shades correspond to
the case when no passive sharing is applied to the EH-MBSs,
i.e., when MNOs cannot apply the RE-BG scheme (No RE-
BG). Dark shades indicate the application of RE-DA, while
the light ones stand for the use of SG-only energy for the EH-
SBSs. As can be observed, both individual and combined use
of our proposals in the studied area induces significantly lower
costs to all MNOs, n = 1, 2, 3. According to the figure, all
MNOs are significantly benefited by both RE-BG (green-red
comparison) and RE-DA (dark-light shades comparison), even
resulting in an elimination of the created costs. In comparison
to the SG-only case, MNOs n = 1,2, 3 achieve a 63%, 44%,
36% reduction of expenses, respectively, thanks to RE-BG and
an 82%, 62% and 65% one, respectively thanks to RE-DA.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the problem of REE in late-trend
multi-MNO networks. We proposed REE methods (i) among
collocated and passively shared EH-MBSs with an RE sharing
approach, RE-BG, which is based on cooperative bankruptcy
games and (ii) an aggregator-assisted RE trading approach,
RE-DA, that applies an initial internal REE followed by a
double auction among the InP provided EH-SBSs managed by
the same and different MNOs, respectively. In the first case,
we showed that RE-BG allows at least 9 hours of SG energy
independence for all EH-MBSs of the MNOs during non-solar
hours and a fairer RE allocation in comparison to baseline
schemes. In the second case, we showed that RE-DA reduces
SG energy consumption to a 12% of the one resulted with a
SG-only operation. Combined use of solar and wind powered
EH-SBSs at a mediocre analogy indicated more efficient use
of RE, with the allocation of sufficient payoffs to both players
and the auctioneer-aggregator. Careful consideration though
should be given to the limitations imposed by the auctioneer-
aggregator. Finally, our proposals considerably reduce indi-
vidual MNO costs, resulting even to an elimination of MNO
expenses on SG purchases in their combined application.
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